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1. A permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) has
progressed from a dream to the threshold of reality in a span of time
few thought possible.' A substantial amount of work on the ICC's Stat-
ute has been done. Scholars have prepared texts and the United Na-
tions' Sixth Committee has convened sessions of a Preparatory Com-
mittee (PrepCom) to develop a Statute. A diplomatic conference is now
set for 1998. Today, the ICC is being discussed in practical and imme-
diate terms.
2. This paper focuses on administrative and financial issues that
relate to the International Criminal Court. Why is this important? The
experience of the two ad hoc tribunals has shown that practical and
administrative issues are important in determining how effective insti-
tutions of international justice can be. Table 1 highlights reasons why
these issues are important enough to command the attention of diplo-
mats, scholars, and practitioners today.
* Consultant, International Human Rights Law Institute; Partner, Pierson, Semmes
and Bemis, Washington, D.C.
** Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul
University; President, Association Internationale de Droit Pdnal; President, Interna-
tional Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences.
1. This paper uses the term "International Criminal Court" (ICC) because of its
common usage. As analyses such as this one make clear, it is sometimes necessary to
distinguish between the institution as a whole and the judicial organ, which is more
commonly referred to as the Court. This paper uses the term "Tribunal" to refer to the
institution as a whole. Using the name International Criminal Tribunal would also fol-
low the practice used by the United Nations in naming the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
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Table 1
Importance of Administrative and Financial Issues
1. Credibility will be the ICC's strongest asset.
2. Sound administration builds credibility.
3. Bureaucratic delays and financial difficulties can block
the course of justice.
4. Swift action is essential for effective investigations and
can deter crime.
5. Smooth administration allows the ICC to better achieve
its mission.
6. Only an effective ICC can deliver justice.
3. The final row in Table 1 deserves special mention. The world
has many ways to do justice-civil law, common law, and Islamic law
being only three such systems. Many of the decisions being made in
the drafting of the ICC's Statute draw on the elements of one legal
system or another. However vigorous those debates may be, everyone
involved shares the viewpoint that only an EFFECTIVE court can deliver
justice. Diplomats involved in shaping the ICC's Statute will want to
take into full account the practical, administrative, and financial is-
sues that will determine the effectiveness of the ICC.
A. Eight Opportunities with the International Criminal Court
4. Consider the following eight opportunities to improve upon the
ad hoc tribunals that can be created by careful shaping of the Statute
of the ICC:
1. Avoid slow startup
5. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) were criticized for being slow to start their work. The Statute
of the ICTY was adopted by the United Nations Security Council on
May 25, 1993.2 A Prosecutor was not chosen until late October 1993,
although he resigned before relocating to The Hague. A new Prosecu-
tor was not agreed upon until July 1994. And even though a Deputy
Prosecutor took office in February 1994, bureaucratic obstacles in hir-
ing key personnel prevented the first field investigation from starting
until late July 1994.3
2. U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., 48th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993).
3. I. Guest, On Trial: The United Nations, War Crimes, and the Former Yugoslavia,
Sept. 1995. This important monograph highlights the problems of the United Nations
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6. The Statute of the ICTR was adopted by the Security Council
on November 8, 1994.4 Although Prosecutor Richard Goldstone of the
ICTY was named Prosecutor of the ICTR, as well, and although the
Appeal Chamber of the ICTY also serves as the Appeal Chamber of
the ICTR, similar startup problems plagued the work of the ICTR. It
was not until mid-1995 that several key administrators were fully in
place at the seat of the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. The start-up
problems of the ICTR can be highlighted with a single statistic: OF
THE $12.9 MILLION BUDGETED FOR THE ICTR IN 1995, ONLY $1.6 MILLION
OF IT WAS SPENT.
5
7. In contrast to the ICTY and the ICTR, the opportunity exists
for the ICC to create a small, permanent "core" staff that can quickly
be "ramped-up" to larger size whenever needed.
2. Avoid funding problems
8. The work of the ICTY was particularly delayed by three specific
funding problems:
- PAYMENT OF BILLS. A two-year dispute over whether the ICTY
would be funded out of the general U.N. budget or the peacekeep-
ing budget made it difficult for United Nations financial officials to
raise and manage cash to pay the ICTY's expenses. Also, the need
to shift cash from one account to another in order to fund the ICTY
was a drain on bureaucratic resources until mid-1995.
* MIS-ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES. Initial budgets for the ICTY, pre-
pared at United Nations headquarters, allocated most of the budget
- roughly two-thirds - to judges, administration and overhead
and only $562,300 to the expenses of investigations over a two-year
period. In part, this was due to inexperience in managing an enter-
prise like a tribunal. Later budgets, prepared in The Hague, had
more balanced allocations between the expenses of investigations,
salaries, and the other costs of operating a court.
- CHRONIC CASH SHORTAGES. Arrearages of certain States, particu-
larly the United States, make fiscal life a challenge for the ICTY.
Cash shortages at the United Nations that occur regularly in the
Commission of Experts on the Former Yugoslavia and of the ICTY. See also C. Bassiouni,
Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia,
Occasional Paper No. 2, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University
College of Law (1996), for a discussion of the bureaucratic problems faced by the Com-
mission of Experts.
4. U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg., 49th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
5. Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Respondible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Geno-
cide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Be-
tween 1 January and 31 December, 1994, Report of the Advisory Committee on Adminis-
trative and Budgetary Questions, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 160, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/50/9 (1996) [hereinafter Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions]. All references to dollars in this paper are to United States dollars.
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fourth quarter of each year have disrupted important travel by in-
vestigators working for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).
9. With the ICC, mechanisms need to be set up to avoid those
funding problems.
3. Avoid apprehension problems
10. Both the ICTY and the ICTR have had difficulty in persuading
authorities to apprehend indicted war criminals within their jurisdic-
tions. Recent reports by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's)
have highlighted the fact that the whereabouts of many indicted, and
often notorious, war criminals are known, yet authorities do nothing to
apprehend those who have been indicted.
6
11. For the ICC, the opportunity exists to mitigate this problem,
even if it may not be solved altogether. The ICC can hire staff mem-
bers capable of facilitating national apprehension efforts. To some ex-
tent, however, the issue may be moot if the ICC Statute requires the
consent of the State in which an individual is located before a case can
be brought against that individual.
4. Avoid security problems with the Aegon building as presently
configured
12. The ICTY is headquartered in The Hague in the former office
building of an insurance company, Aegon. When the United Nations
chose The Netherlands as the seat of the ICTY in 1993, it became im-
portant to find a building to house the ICTY that met as many of the
necessary criteria as possible, and that could be occupied as quickly as
possible. The Aegon building was the best available on short notice for
a tribunal whose long-term future was, at the time, unknown. How-
ever, the Aegon building was not chosen explicitly as the site of a per-
manent international criminal court. Experience has shown that, for
long-term use, the Aegon building will require a number of improve-
ments to increase security. These problems need to be considered, at
least, before a decision can be taken to headquarter the ICC in the
Aegon building permanently. It may be less costly in the long run, and
more secure, to locate the ICC elsewhere in The Hague.
6. See Steven Lee Myers, Rights Group Says Bosnian Suspects Flaunt Freedom, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 26, 1996, at All (reporting on the Coalition for International Justice's report
on the whereabouts of 36 of 67 at-large indicted war criminals from the ICTY). Human
Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues released a




5. Avoid allegations (such as those made against one individual
in the ICTR) of mismanagement in personnel decisions and
procurement
13. Administrative support for the ICTR became a public issue
when the New York Times reported on October 30, 1996, that someone
on the staff of the U.N.'s Office of Investigative Oversight Services
(OIOS) was investigating the Chief of Administration of the ICTR.
7 It
was not clear which body within the United Nations structure, if any,
should have been responsible for supervising the activities of the ICTR
Registry.
14. For the ICC, it will be possible to set up a supervisory struc-
ture that will help minimize the risk of mismanagement, without, at
the same time, engaging in micromanagement or binding the ICC in
bureaucratic red tape. One way this can be achieved is to establish a
Committee of States Parties with overall responsibility for the budget
of the ICC and to have the Committee select a smaller council to han-
dle oversights.
6. Improve the administrative chain of command
15. Another issue with the ICTY and the ICTR is the administra-
tive chain of command. Under the Tribunals' statutes, much of the ad-
ministrative support for the activities of the OTP is handled through
the Registry." Thus, those performing certain important tasks for the
Prosecutor's office do not report to the Prosecutor, but instead report
to the Registrar. While this organizational structure may produce cer-
tain administrative efficiencies, this "dotted-line" relationship has not
proven efficient overall.
16. For the ICC, the administrative staff for the Prosecutor should
be accountable directly to the Prosecutor.
7. Provide better protection for witnesses
17. Witness protection is handled in a separate unit in the Regis-
tries of both the ICTY and the ICTR. Both units are small and rely on
cooperation from States to protect witnesses whose lives or families
are at risk from reprisals and intimidation. These units do not have
enough resources to protect those at risk. Witnesses who would have
testified for the ICTR have already been killed, and ICTY witnesses
have already been intimidated.
7. Barbara Crossette, UN Investigates Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal Officials, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1996, at A3.
8. ICTY Statute, Article 17(1), "The Registry shall be responsible for the administra-
tion and servicing of the International Tribunal." ICTR Statute, Article 16(1), adds "for
Rwanda" to the same sentence.
1997
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY
18. For the ICC, the opportunity exists to fund witness protection
more fully.
8. Improve staff management
19. With the ICTY and the ICTR both wanting to start investiga-
tions as quickly as possible, delays in making personnel decisions
translate into lost investigative opportunities.
20. For the ICC, the opportunity exists to develop personnel rules
tailored to the unique needs of a prosecutorial and judicial body, while
still taking into account the need for equitable geographic distribution
and the need to recruit internationally from the five regions of the
world.
21. A similar problem faced by the ICTY and the ICTR has been a
problem with second staff. The ICC should be able to develop an ex-
perienced core (senior) staff, with second staff supporting them.
B. Five Successes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals To Continue in the Interna-
tional Criminal Court
22. At the same time, as the establishment of the ICC creates op-
portunities to solve some of the problems that have affected the work
of the ad hoc tribunals, there are a number of administrative aspects
of the ICTY and ICTR that have worked and should be kept in the
ICC:
1. Independence of the Chief Prosecutor from outside political
influences
23. The Chief Prosecutors of the ICTY and the ICTR have always
considered the position to be independent of outside political influ-
ences. This independence needs to be continued in the ICC.
2. Ability to attract the highest-quality professionals from around
the world
24. Because of the historic importance of the ICTY and ICTR, both
tribunals have been able to attract excellent candidates from many
States, either as direct hires or secondaries. Keeping up this level of
quality is important for the work of the ICC, as well. The ICC must
impose demanding recruiting standards that take into account the
need for equitable geographic distribution and the need to recruit in-
ternationally from the five regions of the world.
3. Having The Netherlands as host country
25. Having The Netherlands as host country for the ICTY has
worked well. The Netherlands is regarded by many outside observers
as an excellent potential host for the ICC.
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4. Ability to accept help from outside sources
26. Under the Security Council resolutions that established the
ICTY and ICTR, both tribunals are able to accept help from States, In-
ter-Governmental Organizations (IGO's) and Non-Governmental Orga-
nizations (NGO's). 9 The ICC should be able to do the same.
5. Free flow of discussion among Prosecutorial staff
27. One important management practice that has worked well in
the ICTY is the free flow of discussion among Prosecutorial staff. This
is mediated by intra-office email, but it is also part of the culture of
the office. This practice should continue in the OTP of the ICC.
28. In one respect, the ICC will be different: its staff are likely to
be dispersed in field offices around the world. In addition, not all staff
will be on active duty, and a way must, and can, be found for a wide-
spread staff to communicate securely.
II. OVERVIEW OF ICC PROCEDURE
A. When a 'Matter" Arises
29. Part II presents an overview of the procedures to be used in
the ICC. It is not intended as a formal analysis of the substantive or
procedural provisions of the proposed ICC Statute. Instead, it is in-
tended to provide context for the discussion of administrative and fi-
nancial issues in the remaining six parts of this paper.
30. The starting point is how a "matter" would come before the
ICC. In this paper, "matter" is used to refer to the scope of the Prose-
cutor's investigation. For example, "the Former Yugoslavia, 1991-pres-
ent," if it had occurred after an ICC came into being, would have been
counted as one matter. "Rwanda 1994" would have been counted as an-
other matter.
31. For this paper, a matter consists of one or more "cases." A case
would include a relatively discrete number of witnesses and potential
defendants. For example, "Mass Killings at Omarska Camp" would be
one case and "Siege of Sarajevo" would be another case.
32. Chart 1 shows how a matter proceeds through the ICC. First,
a matter is initiated by a complaint. Who can bring a complaint is dis-
cussed in subpart II C below. Second, the Prosecutor then investigates
the complaint. This is discussed in more detail in subpart II F below.
9. Under S.C. Res. 827 (1993), paragraph 5, the Security Council "[u]rges States and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute funds, equipment
and services to the International Tribunal [for the former Yugoslavia], including the of-
fer of expert personnel." S.C. Res. 955 (1994) uses the same language in paragraph 4
with respect to the ICTR.
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33. If the Prosecutor decides a case is meritorious enough, the in-
dictment is presented to the Indictment and Preliminary Matters
Chamber (IPMC). The purpose of the IPMC is to review the evidence
presented by the Prosecutor and decide whether to issue the indict-
ment. The IPMC thus serves as the "filter mechanism" to ensure that
only meritorious cases go forward. The IPMC consists of three judges
and one alternate judge. It is in permanent session in The Hague and
is able to hear urgent matters without delay. The IPMC also holds pre-
trial hearings and can have one or more of its members serve as su-
pervising judges where appropriate to protect the interests of poten-
tially interested but unidentified parties during the early stage of an
investigation.
34. An indicted suspect is brought to trial in the first instance
before a Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber consists of three judges
with one alternate.' 0 The judges on a trial chamber would have to be
ready to convene within 30 days' notice.
35. After the Trial Chamber delivers its verdict, the case can be
appealed to an Appeal Chamber. The decision of the Appeal Chamber
is final. The Appeal Chamber consists of five or seven judges, who are
assigned permanently to the Appeal Chamber. It would need to be
ready to convene on 90 days' notice.




How a Matter Proceeds Through the ICC
Complaint Initiated
" On Prosecutor's own initiative
• By State Party
* By U.N. Security Council
- Otherwise as provided by Statute
Investigatory Stage
" Prosecutor assembles investigation team
" Prosecutor investigates
" Prosecutor decides whether to indict
Indictment and Preliminary
Matters Chamber
* Chamber in permanent session
- 3 judges, 1 alternate
- Holds hearing to confirm indictment
- Also holds pre-trial hearings
Trial Chamber
- Chamber of frst instance
* 3-5 judges, 1 alternate
- Different judges as I&PM Chamber
- Convenes on 30 days' notice
Appeal Chamber
* Judgment is final
• 5-7 judges
- Appeal judges permanently assigned
- Convenes on 90 days' notice
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B. Crimes in the ICC's Mandate
36. Which crimes are to be included in the ICC's mandate is a
matter of much debate." For planning purposes, the following crimes
are assumed to be within the mandate of the ICC:
1. Genocide.
2. Aggression.
3. Violations of the Laws and Customs of War.
4. Crimes Against Humanity.
5. Treaty Crimes.
37. Treaty crimes - cases brought to the ICC by the agreement of
States that do not fall in any of the first four categories - require sep-
arate discussion in this paper. The scope of a treaty crime prosecuted
by the ICC would be set out in the reference by the treaty States to
the ICC. Treaty crimes might not be of a magnitude of Genocide or
Crimes Against Humanity. It could trivialize the prosecution of more
horrible crimes if, at the same time, a chamber were hearing a case in-
volving one or two victims that was before the court only because two
States did not trust each other's judicial system to prosecute the
defendant.12 For that reason, it may be desirable to try treaty crime
cases before a separate chamber of judges.
38. Treaty crime cases might also have a separate status in the
way resources are allocated to them. For example, interested States
may offer to contribute prosecutors (including a special Deputy Prose-
cutor), investigators, and other resources to treaty crime cases. Be-
cause of the potential impact treaty crime cases could have on other
needs of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor should be able to decide whether
to accept a treaty crime matter, whether to accept contributed staff of-
fered by an interested State, and what other terms and conditions
must be met before the ICC takes on a treaty crime case.
C. Potential Sources of Complaints
39. Who can bring complaints to be investigated by the Prosecutor
of an ICC is also a controversial issue. 3 There are four possibilities:
1. ICC States Parties.
2. The United Nations Security Council.
11. See generally Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, Vol. I, 58-115,
U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996) (hereinafter PrepCom Report).
12. That is not to say that such small cases should not be before the ICC. Much of
the ICC's work, at least at first, may involve treaty crime cases where States believe
that only an international criminal body can fairly prosecute and judge a certain
defendant.




4. States Parties to the Genocide Convention may be able to bring
complaints raising allegations of Geno cide even if they are not parties
to the ICC treaty.
D. Elements of a Complaint by a State
40. The necessary elements of a complaint are not fully settled,
but their outline seems clear.14 A complaint must provide the following
information:
a. Jurisdictional basis in the ICC's Statute.
b. Allegations of specific criminal conduct at a specified time and
place.
c. Identity and whereabouts of suspects, if known.
d. Identity and whereabouts of witnesses, if known.
e. Location of evidence.
f. Details of investigations undertaken by the corn plaining State
or other States.
E. The 'Filter Mechanism"
41. At some point before there is a full trial, there will be a judi-
cial "filter mechanism" to prevent non-meritorious cases from going
forward. Clearly, the Prosecutor acts as a filter, as it is assumed that
the Prosecutor will not bring non-meritorious cases. A second, judicial
filter will occur during the review of the indictment by the Indictment
and Preliminary Matters Chamber (IPMC), before a case goes to a
Trial Chamber.
42. Some States, however, have suggested a judicial "filter mecha-
nism" that would occur even before the Prosecutor can begin an inves-
tigation. They may view even the initiation of an investigation by the
Prosecutor as having an important political effect. This kind of "filter
mechanism" would arguably prevent a "runaway Prosecutor" from
launching an investigation.
43. It is hard to see how such a mechanism would be effective in
practice. Such a "filter mechanism" can almost certainly be outflanked
by an adroit Prosecutor. For example, assume that there must be a ju-
dicial review before a Prosecutor can launch an investigation sua
sponte. Assume further that there is no such judicial review of com-
plaints brought by States. Under such a system, an adroit Prosecutor
should have no difficulty finding a State Party to bring the complaint,
obviating the need for the Prosecutor to initiate the complaint directly.
14. See id. at 1 217; see also id. at '9 120, 216-19.
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44. In addition, if a single judge serves as the pre-investigative
"filtering mechanism," there will probably be a rotation process to en-
sure that one judge does not carry the "filtration" burden alone. Judi-
cial rotation in confirmation of indictments is the practice at the ICTY,
where this responsibility is periodically assigned to a different judge.
The Prosecutor of the ICC could wait until the rotation process turns
up a favorable judge before going through the "filter mechanism."
45. In any case, judicial review prior to the Prosecutor's investiga-
tion presents numerous practical and legal challenges. The most obvi-
ous of the practical challenges is how the judges would make an in-
formed decision. In the absence of an investigation, judges would have
to rely on information available to the Prosecutor and to them, namely
government sources and media reports. The obvious questions are
"which government?" and "whose media?," as allegations of bias in cov-
ering atrocities is one of the most challenging problems that analysts
have faced. The same questions can be asked about IGO and NGO re-
ports of atrocities. In many cases, only field investigations are likely to
yield conclusive evidence.
46. An obvious legal problem with a judicial "filter mechanism" is
the legal standard to be used. The ICTY rules of procedure require the
Prosecutor to have "reasonable grounds" before submitting an indict-
ment for confirmation.1 5 In common-law States, police are required to
have "probable cause" before taking action, such as a search, against a
citizen. Should the standard for review, even before an investigation
has been made be "reasonable grounds," "probable cause," or some
lesser standard? It is hard to see what level of judicial scrutiny is
appropriate.
47. Finally, the delay caused by any pre-investigative "filter mech-
anism" would create the opportunity for political pressure to be
brought against the Court or the Prosecutor by any State wishing to
bring such pressure. This is particularly so if, as many supporters of a
filter mechanism have called for, the potential defendant or an inter-
ested State is allowed to appear before the judges to contest the Prose-
cutor's application to begin an investigation. Such political pressure
should be prohibited, but that prohibition is likely to shape the way in
which the pressure is brought - not to prevent the pressure from be-
ing brought in the first place.
48. The most likely solution, many observers believe, is that the
appropriate place for a judicial "filter" is in the review of the indict-
ment by the Indictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber. This pro-
vides the proper check on Prosecutorial discretion.
15. ICTY Rules of Procedure, Rule 47(A).
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F. Investigation to Indictment
49. An investigation would formally be initiated by a written order
of the Prosecutor.16 The internal details of an investigation are sup-
posed to be confidential. Cooperation of concerned states is expected.
The Prosecutor can proceed without cooperation in exceptional circum-
stances where there are concerns regarding the objectivity of national
authorities.
50. If, after an investigation, the Prosecutor decides not to seek an
indictment, it is likely that the complainant will be notified. It is possi-
ble that there may be judicial review of a decision not to bring an in-
dictment, although this might well jeopardize the confidentiality of the
Prosecutor's investigation.
51. If the Prosecutor seeks confirmation of the indictment, the evi-
dence will be submitted to the Indictment and Preliminary Matters
Chamber (IPMC). The indictment review thus serves as the "filter
mechanism." There will probably be a preliminary hearing, at which
the Prosecutor will present evidence from the investigation to date. It
is possible that the target of the investigation, or a concerned State,
may have the right to present evidence, although this will likely com-
promise the confidentiality of the proceedings. The judges will have
the opportunity to question the Prosecutor and any witnesses who ap-
pear in support of or opposition to the indictment. Allowing a target or
a State to present evidence may turn the indictment hearing into a
mini-trial of the Prosecutions case - which is something the drafters
of the ICC Statute should explicitly decide is permissible or not.
52. If the IPMC confirms the indictment, States would be notified
to arrest the accused and to assist any further investigation the Prose-
cutor may require. There may be hearings before the IPMC on prelimi-
nary legal issues. If the accused has accumulated assets, the IPMC
may be able to consider freezing those assets. In the event that the ac-
cused is not arrested, the IPMC may choose to hold a hearing in the
absence of the accused that is modeled on the ICTY's Rule 61
procedure.
53. In some field investigations, the IPMC may find it necessary to
use a supervising judge to oversee certain aspects of an investigation
to protect evidence for future use at trial while also protecting the
rights of as-yet unidentified defendants. For example, prior to the con-
firmation of an indictment, the supervising judge could help to protect
the interests of as-yet unidentified defendants in preserving evidence
from a mass grave exhumation. If a partially damaged building must
be demolished, a supervising judge could be used to supervise an in-
vestigation into the source of the shelling that damaged the building.
The supervising judge does not gather the evidence, but rather has the
16. See generally PrepCom Report, supra note 11, at 232-31, 246-52.
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power to direct the Office of the Prosecutor as to the procedures and
protocols to be used. Obviously, the supervising judge could not be
called as a witness at trial, although the supervising judge's rulings
would be part of the record available to the Trial Chamber and the
parties.
54. The alternative procedure, which is accepted practice in most
common-law countries, is for the Prosecutor's office or the police to fol-
low established procedures for investigations. If the procedures are not
followed, however, the use of the evidence in court may be jeopardized.
55. A comparable approach is to specifically empower the Prosecu-
tor's office to consider the rights of possible suspects in gathering evi-
dence and to require the Prosecutor to gather potentially exculpatory
evidence during any investigation. This leaves open the possibility of
challenge if the Prosecutor is deemed after-the-fact not to have been
diligent enough in protecting the rights of possible accused.
56. The use of a supervising judge allows the correction of investi-
gative errors with less risk of jeopardizing the use of evidence at trial.
On the other hand, the Prosecutor may not want a judge involved in
the investigative process. An aggressive supervising judge could come
into conflict with the Prosecutor's office, diminishing the effectiveness
of both.
57. The essential objective is that someone have the ability to pro-
tect the rights of those not present at a field investigation or that
there be some way that the Court, sitting after-the-fact, can be as-
sured that it hears all the relevant evidence it wants to hear about
field investigations.
58. Regardless of the procedure chosen by the drafters of the Stat-
ute and the rules, there is the possibility that the IPMC will play an
active role in a case before the case goes to trial. This is one of the
reasons why the IPMC must be available full-time at the seat of the
Tribunal.
G. Trial at First Instance
59. The trial at first instance before the ICC generally follows
common-law procedure (see Chart 2). First, the Prosecution presents
its case in chief. Then, the defense presents its case in chief. Each side
has the opportunity for rebuttal, after which the Chamber renders a
verdict of conviction or acquittal.
H. Appeal
60. As presently contemplated, the ICC Statute will allow both
the prosecution and defense to appeal. Grounds for appeal will include
erroneous rulings of law, erroneous findings of fact, errors in proce-
dure, and errors in the disproportionality of sentences.
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61. It is possible that only the defense may be able to assert erro-
neous findings of fact as a ground for appeal. Many common-law sys-
tems do not allow the prosecution to appeal from an allegedly errone-
ous finding of fact. The countervailing argument is that the offenses
under consideration by the ICC are the most heinous known and the
need for justice to be done requires that the Prosecutor be able to ap-
peal from an erroneous ruling of fact.
62. In addition, the defense would be able to assert as a ground
for appeal that newly discovered evidence warrants setting aside the
verdict or reducing the sentence. 17 If such an appeal were upheld, the
case would probably be referred back to a Trial Chamber for further
proceedings.
63. The Appeal Chamber would review any alleged errors of the
Trial Chamber and issue an opinion. The ultimate decision of the Ap-
peal Chamber would be final.
III. Locus AND PHYSICAL PREMISES OF THE TRIBUNAL
A. Objectives in Selecting the Location
64. In a sense, one of the first practical decisions that must be
made is to select the location of the seat of the Tribunal. While the
ICTY is based in The Hague, The Netherlands, and the ICTR is based
in Arusha, Tanzania, those locations and others should be considered
as the possible seat of a permanent international criminal tribunal.
Among the criteria should be:
" Full diplomatic support from the host State.
" A host State internationally respected for observing the rule of
law.
" Access to international transportation networks.
" Excellent telecommunications infrastructure.
• Reasonable cost of living for support staff.
" Availability of multilingual local-hire personnel, particularly in
the ICC's official languages.
- Reasonably attractive living conditions for international staff and
their families.
17. One expert has pointed out that if the prosecutor is allowed to appeal on the ba-
sis of an error of fact, this will allow the prosecution to bring to the Court's attention
during the appellate process any newly discovered evidence that becomes known prior to
the issuance of the Appeal Chamber's decision. In this limited situation, the ground of
newly discovered evidence would be available to the Prosecutor also.
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Chart 2
Trial at First Instance Follows Common-Law Procedure
65. For many reasons, the site of the Tribunal should be in The
Netherlands in general, and in The Hague in particular. The Hague
meets the practical criteria outlined above.
66. From a symbolic perspective, The Hague is also the best choice
for the site of the ICC. The Hague has long been regarded as the focal
point for institutions of international justice. The Hague is the site of
the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the ICTY,
Europol (European Police), and other institutions. The Hague has also
served as the host for important international conferences and agree-
ments. The Hague is the best location available for the site of the ICC.
B. Physical Premises of the Tribunal
67. The building in which the ICC is headquartered should have
certain characteristics. The headquarters of the ICC must be secure,
but must also provide dignified office and courtroom facilities appropri-
ate for the seat of international criminal justice. The building should
have at least two courtrooms so that a single case does not prevent
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other cases from being heard. The building should also have holding
cells and secure areas for moving those in custody without exposing
them to public areas. This is done for the security of those in custody
as well as the security of the public and Tribunal personnel. (Longer-
term detention facilities would presumably be off-site.)
68. There must be adequate space for press and communications
equipment. The ICC will need its own satellite dish for communica-
tions to field offices and staff.
69. In many cases, trials in the first instance will be held in, or
close to, where the crimes occurred. In deciding whether to hold trials
in the first instance at the seat of the Tribunal or elsewhere, some is-
sues that must be considered are security, how long investigations and
trials are likely to take, the number of defendants, and the other crite-
ria used to select the seat of the Tribunal discussed in subpart A
above.
C. The Importance of Security in Choosing a Building for the ICC
70. One of the most important issues in choosing the premises of
the Tribunal is security. Obviously, access to the building must be con-
trollable. Beyond this, however, are other concerns. For example, it
would be preferable to avoid having adjacent buildings easily accessi-
ble to the public. Any space in the Tribunal building for parking vehi-
cles must be especially secure. Ideally, the building should be a safe
distance from streets. Finally, the building should be reasonably safe
from surveillance.
D. Major Expenditures Are Required To Make the Aegon Building in
The Hague a Secure Site for a Permanent Tribunal
71. The working assumption used in this paper is that the seat of
the ICC will be in The Hague. At present, the ICTY occupies the
Aegon building, an impressive edifice that formerly was the office of a
major international insurance company, Aegon, N.V.
72. The United Nations has invested considerable sums to make
the Aegon building into a suitable headquarters building for the ICTY.
Nevertheless, when the ICC is set up, consideration should be given
afresh as to whether the Aegon building is indeed the best place for
the seat of a permanent ICC. Of particular concern should be issues of
security. For example:
1. The Aegon building is adjacent to the Congresgebouw (Confer-
ence Center) in The Hague. A hotel is being constructed above the
Congresgebouw that overlooks the Aegon building. The ICC would
have to consider installing and maintaining security controls in
nearby buildings, including the Congresgebouw and its hotel. This
is estimated to cost $250,000 for metal detectors, plus an annual
cost of $400,000 for 15 full-time security guards, 1 supervisor, and
their equipment.
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2. A partial alternative would be to do major remodeling in the
Aegon building to move the current courtroom and the as yet in-
complete second courtroom into the interior portion of the Aegon
building. This is estimated to cost $3,000,000, but this does nothing
to secure much of the building, including its entrance and offices.
3. An essential security provision is to install barriers to control car
and truck traffic into and out of the Aegon garage. This is esti-
mated to cost $150,000.
4. The security of the Aegon building could be improved signifi-
cantly by closing the adjacent streets, Johann de Wittlaan and
Eisenhowerlaan. It would cost relatively little to do this - perhaps
$100,000 for traffic flow barriers and $250,000 to relocate the tram
lines on Eisenhowerlaan. However, there would be major disrup-
tions to traffic patterns in The Hague from the closure of Johann
de Wittlaan. The cost of this disruption, while non-monetary, needs
to be taken into account.
5. The ICC could consider buying the adjacent residential and office
buildings on northwest side of Eisenhowerlaan. This is estimated to
cost $6,000,000, but the buildings could be used as non-secure of-
fice space or as residences for Tribunal staff.
73. The expenses of securing the Aegon building could be so high
that the Committee on States Parties should consider whether to ei-
ther locate or construct a new building in a more secure location in
The Hague. This might require some assistance from the Government
of The Netherlands in locating a suitable site. The Netherlands may
wish to donate the land on which the Committee of States Parties
would pay to have a building constructed. The Committee should con-
sider establishing a building fund to pay for the cost of the building.
However, given the problems that the ICTY had in 1994, it seemed to
some observers that renovating the Aegon building had a higher prior-
ity for the United Nations than paying the expenses of investigations
The Committee should be sensitive to the need to fund ongoing inves-
tigations first.
E. Transition from the Ad Hoc Tribunals to the ICC
74. An issue with important administrative and financial implica-
tions - not to mention political and legal implications - is the rela-
tionship between the ad hoc tribunals, especially the ICTY, and the
ICC. This subject is addressed here because it may not be possible for
both the ICTY and the ICC to occupy the Aegon building at the same
time.
75. Clearly, after the ICC Statute is approved, the United Nations
Security Council will have to decide whether to merge the caseload or
responsibilities of the ICTY and the ICTR into the ICC. The time pe-
riod between approval of the ICC Statute and its coming into force will
give the Security Council adequate time to make this decision. Merg-
ing the institutions offers advantages in consistency of prosecutorial
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and judicial decisions, as well as significant administrative cost sav-
ings amounting to millions of dollars a year.
76. For administrative and budgetary reasons, if nothing else, the
drafters of the ICC Statute should consider the possibility that the
ICC will be assigned certain responsibilities from the ICTY and the
ICTR. If this happens, the ICC will require a significant number of
prosecutorial and administrative staff at the outset and a more signifi-
cant budget than if the ICC were kept separate from the ICTY and the
ICTR. If the ICC undertakes some of the responsibilities of the ICTY
and ICTR, the United Nations should be required to contribute some
of the funding for any ongoing investigations or prosecutions.'8 The
Committee of States Parties of the ICC will have to consider whether
to appoint new or existing ICTY/ICTR judges and officials to posts in
the ICC.
77. This paper recommends that, at a minimum, the ICC should
inherit the long-term responsibilities of the ad hoc tribunals. This
would include:
" Prosecutions of indicted persons not apprehended until after
many years.
" Supervision of the terms and conditions of persons sentenced by
the ICTY or the ICTR.
* Appeals on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
* Continuation of efforts to apprehend indicted suspects still at
large.
* Maintenance of the archives of the ICTY and ICTR when they
are no longer active.
IV. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
A. Concepts
78. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is the largest component
of the ICC. As the experience of the ICTY and ICTR has shown, the
OTP will be the driving engine in the work of the ICC. The size and
organization of the OTP are determined, in turn, by the caseload of
the ICC.
79. The caseload of the ICC is difficult to predict with much cer-
tainty. Historical precedent suggests that the number of wars and
other situations that might have been referred to the ICC, if it had ex-
isted, is considerable. This implies a steady workload. On the other
hand, many experts believe that the end of the Cold War will, over the
long run, reduce the frequency of conflicts that would give rise to mat-
ters before an ICC. In addition, one of the goals of the ICC is to deter
the violations of international humanitarian law that are within the
18. For planning purposes in this paper, it is assumed that the United Nations pays
for the incremental costs of ICTY and ICTR investigations and prosecutions.
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mandate of the ICC. If the ICC is successful, its existence and effec-
tiveness will cause it to have fewer matters to handle than it would
have handled in the immediate post-World War II world.
80. We can expect that the ICC may have some very busy periods,
analogous to 1997, when there are two active ad hoc international
criminal tribunals. It is also possible that the ICC will go through pe-
riods of substantial inactivity. The structure of the OTP must reflect
these potential swings in the workload.
1. Minimize overhead, maximize capability
81. One way to accommodate swings in workload is to minimize
the overhead of the ICC when there are no active matters and yet also
be able to "ramp-up" quickly to be able to handle a large caseload if
the need arises. If there are no active matters, the ICC must strive to
keep costs to a minimum. High costs during periods of substantial in-
activity will diminish public support for the institution. The sight of a
large and (by the standards of many States) well-paid staff with ap-
parently little to do except polish the rules of procedure will discour-
age States from supporting the ICC until they need the ICC to do
something. As with a fire department, the ICC must be kept going if it
is to be able to respond quickly when called into action.
82. This means that the OTP will need a small, permanent staff of
a sufficient size so that it can respond quickly to crises. When a mat-
ter becomes active, someone has to be around to take swift steps to
preserve evidence and start interviewing witnesses. Someone else has
to be around to "ramp up" the office by mobilizing the full investiga-
tive and prosecutorial team. In an ongoing matter where crimes are
still being committed, lengthy delays to hire staff will diminish the
ICC's capacity to deter further crimes.
2. Model: The Military Reserve System
83. One model for the OTP to follow is the military reserve system
in use in many States. Table 2 shows how this analogy works:
Table 2
The Reserves Analogy for the Office of the Prosecutor
1. Permanent OTP Staff (the "active duty" staff).
2. Case Units (the "active reserves").
3. Advisers and Consultants (the "inactive reserves").
84. The permanent OTP staff is analogous to active duty military
forces: able to respond immediately to matters that arise. The active
duty forces also include those necessary to mobilize the "active re-
serve" Case Units of prosecutors and investigators. Unlike most mili-
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tary forces, however, for the OTP, the permanent staff would be signif-
icantly smaller than the number of prosecutors and investigators in
active reserves.
85. Those prosecutors and investigators who have retired or may
be unavailable to serve on full-time status with the ICC OTP may be
available nevertheless as an "inactive reserve" of advisers who can as-
sist on particular projects or can be consulted by the Prosecutor on a
confidential basis in making particular decisions.
86. Another key concept in the OTP is the creation of a Startup
Unit, for a short, initial period. The purpose of the Startup Unit is to
develop the procedures and protocols for the OTP. The Startup Unit
should draw in part on ICTY and ICTR veterans. The Startup Unit is
discussed in more detail in section IV B 2, paragraph 91, below.
87. The OTP must also have a Deployment Unit of administrators
responsible for handling the mobilization of the Case Units. This is
discussed in subsection IV B 3 a, paragraph 96.
88. The Case Units are the heart of the OTP during an active
matter. They handle the investigation and prosecution of cases. One
Case Unit must be a "ready reserve" unit able to be activated at short
notice - a week or less. (If the workload justifies it, this unit might
become part of the permanent staff.) This is discussed in section IV B
3 b, paragraph 97. Other Case Units would be activated on reasonable
notice, such as 30 days. See section IV B 4, paragraph 100.
89. If the workload is sufficiently great, the OTP should also have
specialized Support Units to handle technical aspects of investigations.
Support Units are discussed below in section IV B 5, paragraph 107.
B. Organization of the Office of the Prosecutor
1. The Permanent Staff
90. The permanent staff of the OTP should include:
- The CHIEF PROSECUTOR. As with the ICTY/ICTR, the Prosecutor
would hold the equivalent rank of a United Nations Undersecre-
tary-General.
* DEPUTY PROSECUTORS will be needed to head up Case Units. They
should be pre-selected, but should not be part of the permanent
staff.
' The IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR would include a Chief
of Staff and a Personal Assistant to the Prosecutor.
* An ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF that handles (i) administration, (ii)
budget and finance, (iii) personnel, and (iv) travel. This unit would
consist of five professionals - one in each functional area, plus one
chief of the unit - along with 3 support staff. Note that this repre-
sents a change from the way the ICTY and ICTR are organized. In
the ICTY and the ICTR, the administrators, who perform these
functions for the OTP, are located in the Registry, and report to
the Registrar, not the Prosecutor. In most governments and in the
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private sector, such an arrangement is unusual, to say the least. In
the case of the ad hoc tribunals, it created the potential, at least,
for conflicting priorities such as if the Registrar were to think one
task the most important and the Prosecutor were to think another
task deserved the most attention. Giving the Prosecutor the man-
agement responsibility for administrative staff who service the OTP
is an important and necessary step toward improving the adminis-
trative support for the OTP within the Tribunal. This will require
specific language in the ICC Statute to implement.
- A LEGAL SERVICES UNIrr that consists of (i) a counsel for interna-
tional humanitarian law and the law of war, (ii) a counsel for com-
parative criminal law and comparative criminal procedure, (iii) a
counsel for international legal assistance, including extradition,
mutual legal assistance and the transfer of prisoners. These three
professionals would be assisted by a paralegal (also known as a le-
gal assistant) and a secretary. These three counselors should be rel-
atively senior and should be world-class experts in at least one of
the fields for which they are responsible. One of their responsibili-
ties is to know who are the other experts in their respective fields.
* A RESEARCH UNIT whose purpose is to track open source informa-
tion, to keep in touch with governments, inter-governmental orga-
nizations, and other relevant organizations. The members of this
unit are not criminal investigators. (Under the plan proposed in
this paper, the Prosecutor has no permanent investigators on staff
until an investigation formally begins.) Instead, their purpose is to
monitor world developments for information that might be poten-
tially relevant if a matter were to arise. The office consists of i) a
chief of unit, (ii) a liaison to ministries of foreign affairs and inter-
governmental organizations, (iii) a liaison to ministries of defense
and regional security bodies such as NATO, (iv) a liaison to na-
tional police forces and INTERPOL, and (v) an archivist to pre-
serve records and evidence. As an example of how regional diver-
sity might apply, one of the four staff professionals in this unit
might be from a "neutral" country, one might be from an English-
speaking country such as the United States or the United King-
dom, one might be from France, Italy or another European country
whose police force enjoys international respect, and the fourth
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2. For the first 18 months after ICC startup
91. When the ICC is first established, during the first 18 months
or so, a group of 6-8 prosecutors, investigators and other professional
staff members, along with 2-4 support staff, should have the responsi-
bility of setting up the Office of the Prosecutor. The responsibilities of
this STARTUP UNIT would include:
" Establishing office procedures and protocols.
" Ensuring premises and equipment are operational.
" Establishing work plans for various contingencies, including hav-
ing matters arise in various parts of the world.
. Establishing initial contacts with governments, inter-
governmental organizations, and others.
" Helping to interview and hire the permanent staff-
* Working for ratification of the ICC treaty by States.
" Negotiating and signing cooperation agreements with States
Parties.
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Chart 4
Office of the Prosecutor
First 18 Months After ICC Startup
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92. To ensure continuity with the ICTY and the ICTR, at least
half of the startup staff should have some kind of experience with ei-
ther one of the ad hoc tribunals. However, to ensure fresh thinking on
problems, at least a fourth member should be chosen from outside the
ICTY and ICTR.
93. The Startup Unit would be headed by a Deputy Prosecutor. Af-
ter the Startup Unit was complete, the Deputy Prosecutor would pre-
sumably head up the "ready reserve" Case Unit.
94. At the end of the 18 month startup period, the Startup Unit
would formally be disbanded. Some Startup Unit staff would no doubt
continue to serve the Tribunal in other capacities. Some would serve
on the permanent staff of the ICC OTP. Others would serve on "re-
serve" Case Units.
3. During the initial weeks of an investigation
95. After the Prosecutor has made the written determination to in-
itiate an investigation, the OTP must "ramp up" its investigation of
the matter. This is done through two units: the Deployment Unit and
the "ready reserve" Case Unit.
a. The Deployment Unit
96. The purpose of the Deployment Unit is to mobilize a Case Unit
when a matter begins. The Deployment Unit would consist of 3-5 ad-
ministrators and 2-4 support staff. It must be available to begin work
on very short notice - as little as a week. As a practical matter, this
means that Deployment Unit staff should come from near the seat of
the Tribunal. Thus, if the seat of the ICC is The Netherlands, Deploy-
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ment Unit personnel might come from The Netherlands or Belgium.
Assuming that members of the Deployment Unit are government ad-
ministrators, their governments must agree to second those individu-
als for a period of 2-3 months at a time. Some may stay on indefi-
nitely, or they may be replaced by permanent staff if the workload for
the Deployment Unit justifies hiring permanent staff.
b. The "Ready Reserve" Case Unit
97. The purpose of the "ready reserve" Case Unit is to investigate
whether the matter should (a) go forward as a formal investigation by
the Prosecutor, (b) be referred to national prosecution, or (c) be
dropped. This unit also must be available on very short notice - about
a week or less. The unit should be headed by a Deputy Prosecutor. To
ensure that a Deputy Prosecutor need not investigate crimes allegedly
committed by, or against, his own nationals, there should be several
Deputy Prosecutors available to the Prosecutor.19
Chart 5
Office of the Prosecutor
During the Initial Weeks of an Investigation
L Deployment
98. The size of the "ready reserve" Case Unit will depend on the
matter. In most cases, it may be sufficient to begin with a staff of 2-4
lawyers, 2-4 investigators, 1-2 legal assistants, 4-6 translators, 1 liai-
19. Which Deputy Prosecutor should take charge of a Case Unit is obviously a mat-
ter that should, in virtually all circumstances, be left to the discretion of the Prosecutor.
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son officer, and 3 support staff. The exact mix of personnel will depend
on the matter.
99. The call-up process for the "ready reserve" Case Unit means
that the number of personnel available must be slightly more than the
number that will actually be fielded. Despite the best intentions, other
professional or personal obligations may make someone unable to join
a Case Unit when a matter arises.
4. Case Units
100. As an investigation moves forward towards indictment and
prosecution, the OTP must be expanded into a larger organization.
Chart 6 shows how the OTP might operate. This is based on the expe-
rience of the ICTY and ICTR.
Chart 6
Office of the Prosecutor
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101. Prosecution of a matter would customarily be in the hands of
a Deputy Prosecutor responsible for that matter. Each matter would be
the responsibility of anywhere from 1 to 20 Case Units, with 3-12 Case
Units being a more typical range.
102. In 1996, the ICTY and the ICTR formally had nine Case
Units each; however, in practice, the approach was more flexible than
this, as some Case Units were larger or smaller than their nominal
staff allotment. The exact number of Case Units in a Task Force will
depend on the specifics of the matter. For example, in the context of
the ICTY, there might be a Case Unit assigned to the ethnic cleansing
of Prijedor, with another Case Unit assigned to the siege of Sarajevo.
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103. Case Units would be grouped into "Task Forces." Thus, if the
ICC had existed when the two ad hoc tribunals were established, there
might now be an ex-Yugoslavia Task Force and a Rwanda Task Force.
104. Each Case Unit would consist of 10-20 professionals and sup-
port staff. Included in a Case Unit would be prosecutors, investigators,
legal assistants, liaison officers (to handle relations with governments,
local officials and the public), translators and interpreters, and support
staff. Case Units may need armed security guards for security in the
field. Case Units may also benefit from outside advisers on specific is-
sues. These could be "alumni" of the OTP and respected academics and
practitioners. These advisers would be the "inactive reserves" of the
OTP.
105. Case Units would be headed by a Deputy Prosecutor. If the
ICC has many ongoing matters, a Deputy Prosecutor might handle
more than one matter. However, the factual expertise required to su-
pervise investigations and prosecutions means that a Deputy Prosecu-
tor will likely handle only one matter. Very small cases might not re-
quire a Deputy Prosecutor, but could be handled by a senior trial
attorney.
106. The Deputy Prosecutor would be assisted by the Chief of In-
vestigations. How the Deputy Prosecutor, the Chief of Investigations
and the Case Units relate to each other organizationally will depend
upon the matter being prosecuted, the phase of the investigation -
early in an investigation it may make more sense to have the Chief of
Investigations more involved than later in the prosecution phase
and even the personal backgrounds of those in charge.
5. Support Units
107. If the workload of the OTP is sufficiently large, the OTP
should add specialized Support Units to support the Case Units. These
units would be staffed permanently if the ICC has more than a few ac-
tive matters at a time. If active matters are few, the OTP would staff
Support Units through seconded personnel or by obtaining necessary
services or expertise directly from outside agencies, private contractors
or other organizations.
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Chart 7
Office of the Prosecutor
Assuming Many Active Matters
108. Examples of possible Support Units in an active OTP are:
a. Victim and Witness Unit
109. The Victim and Witness Unit would arrange for protection
and security of the prosecution's witnesses, when and where needed.
(A separate unit in the Registry would take care of witnesses for the
defense.) In some cases, witness protection is handled by Western-style
relocation to another country. In other cases, the witnesses may have
to be given protection within their own cultural milieu. This unit
would also handle logistics and counseling for witnesses who will be
testifying in court. This unit would consist of 3-20 people.
b. Litigation Support Unit
110. The Litigation Support Unit would handle document manage-
ment for investigations and prosecutions. The Unit would also handle
setting up computer databases for the OTP. This unit would consist of
5-50 people.
c. Computer Services Unit
111. The Computer Services Unit would handle computer support




d. Secure Communications Unit
112. The Secure Communications Unit would handle the ordering
and maintenance of secure communications equipment. Its purpose is
to permit secure communications between the OTP and field units.
This unit would consist of 1-10 people.
e. Research Unit (Expanded)
113. In most cases, the ICC OTP will have a good idea of who
should be prosecuted. In other cases, it will be necessary to use a
Strategy Team to identify the targets of investigations. Both the ICTY
and the ICTR have Strategy Teams. If the number of active matters
justifies it, the Research Unit should be expanded by an additional 5-
50 people to handle factual research other than field investigations.
f. Video and Photo Preservation and Analysis Unit
114. The Video and Photo Preservation and Analysis Unit would
ensure that videotape and photographic evidence is preserved for trial,
it would edit videotape for courtroom presentation, and it would han-
dle research into videotape evidence. This unit would consist of 2-10
people.
g. Press and Information Office
115. The Press and Information office of the OTP would handle
media relations and is responsible for developing a media strategy.
This unit would consist of 2 people. It would serve only the Office of
the Prosecutor; another PIO would serve the Court.
h. Forensic Pathology Unit
116. The Forensic Pathology Unit would perform and coordinate
post-mortem examinations of mass graves and similar evidence. It
would consist of 1-7 people.
i. Forensic Sciences Unit
117. The Forensic Sciences Unit would handle and coordinate sci-
entific investigations other than mass grave exhumation and analysis.
It would also act as liaison to major crime laboratories around the
world. Its personnel would also be available to testify as experts for
the prosecution. This unit would consist of 1-5 people.
C. Field Offices
118. Both ad hoc tribunals have used field offices out of which to
run their investigations. During the war in Bosnia, the ICTY managed
investigations out of its offices in The Hague. However, since the sign-
ing of the Bosnia Peace Agreement in Paris in December 1995, the
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ICTY has begun to work more out of cities in the region, establishing
offices in Zagreb, Sarajevo and, to a limited extent, Belgrade. The
ICTR OTP has been based in Kigali, Rwanda, since the office has been
operational.
119. Clearly, the choice of whether or not to set up a field office
will depend on the specifics of the matter. Among the considerations
that should be used are:
- The availability of transportation links from the prospective field
office to the seat of the Tribunal.
" Communications infrastructure at the prospective field office.
" Security issues.
" The time difference between the prospective field office and the
seat of the Tribunal. As a practical matter, it is likely to be impos-
sible to run an investigation from headquarters if it is more than a
few hours away from the place where crimes are being
investigated.
- The anticipated length of the investigation. If the investigation is
likely to be brief, it may not be necessary to establish a formal field
office.
- Whether the case under investigation is a specific incident or a
series of acts over time.
- Whether the trial chamber will sit locally or at the seat of the
Tribunal. If the Trial Chamber will sit locally, the OTP will almost
certainly want to have a field office there.
120. In general, in the initial stage of a matter, the Case Unit should
probably be based in or near the area where the investigation takes
place.
D. Hiring
121. As with all appointed positions in the Tribunal, hiring of
personnel for the OTP must be based on qualifications and experience,
with due regard for geographical diversity. The staff should be re-
cruited internationally from the five regions of the world, representing
equitable geographical distribution.
122. The OTP will be relying significantly on seconded personnel
in order to avoid either (i) having to maintain a costly full-time staff or
(ii) having to face lengthy delays to hire staff whenever a matter
arises. In particular, most of the staff of Case Units will be secon-
darees from governments, IGO's, the private sector, and other relevant
organizations. Secondarees should be paid by the ICC.
123. The use of seconded personnel has generated some recent
controversy within the United Nations system. The United Nations Se-
curity Council expressly stated in resolutions 827 and 955 that it
urges States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions to contribute funds, equipment and services to the International
Tribunal, including the offer of expert personnel. Despite this state-
ment by the Security Council, a recent Report of the Secretary-
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General 20 takes the position that secondment is
only acceptable on a temporary basis for specific short-term
projects or pending a transition, which should be accomplished
promptly, to budgetary posts funded from assessed contributions
. . . Gratis personnel should be accepted on an exceptional basis,
for a defined, limited period...21
124. There is likely to be opposition to the report of the Secretary-
General as the report is considered by the Fifth Committee. Regardless
of the merits, if any, of the Secretary-General's position as applied to
the ICTY and the ICTR, this position is not a viable option for an ICC
that must be able to "ramp up" quickly with qualified personnel when
a matter arises. The OTP of the ICC must be able to rely on second-
ment of qualified personnel, on terms acceptable to the Prosecutor, in
order to be able to handle important matters as soon as the Prosecutor
has decided to launch an investigation.22
E. Other Expenses
125. The OTP must also budget for other expenses of
investigations.
1. Travel expenses
126. The OTP must allow for substantial expenses for travel of in-
vestigators and prosecutors. Not having enough travel funds has been
a major impediment to the work of the ICTY and ICTR.
2. Secure computers and communications equipment
127. The OTP needs to have secure telephone and telefax equip-
ment. Its computer systems also need to be secured. Some computers
must be Tempest-certified to avoid such attacks. The OTP will need to
have experts keep up with the state-of-the-art in computer and com-
munications security.
3. LEXIS/NEXIS and other computer databases
128. The OTP must have access to computer databases that allow
cost-effective research into both legal and factual issues. LEXIS and
NEXIS are the best known; there are many others in English, French,
and other languages. One area of concern is that an unscrupulous per-
son at a database provider could analyze the searches of the OTP and
thereby learn what the OTP was investigating. The OTP must there-
20. See Gratis Personnel Provided by Governments and Other Entities, UN. GAOR,
51st Sess., Agenda Items 116, 120, 137, 139 and 140(a), U.N. Doc. A/511688 (1996).
21. Id. 1 68-69.
22. Secondment may be useful for the Registry, but the Registry should have
enough lead time to hire qualified personnel when the need arises.
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fore develop a database usage strategy to avoid giving away clues as to
what it is investigating.
4. Armored cars and vans
129. The OTP may need armored cars and vans to transport per-
sonnel in insecure areas, and also to transport prisoners even in safe
areas.
5. Equipment for mass grave exhumations
130. Many of the crimes investigated by the ICC OTP will proba-
bly involve mass grave exhumation and analysis. As the experience of
the ICTY and ICTR has shown, mass grave exhumations are expen-
sive, consuming at a minimum tens of thousands of dollars of disposa-
ble supplies and equipment.
6. Helicopters for transportation in countries where road trans-
portation is difficult or unsafe
131. Travel by road will not always be feasible where the OTP op-
erates. Local road conditions may be impassable during the rainy sea-
son, or roads and bridges may have been effectively destroyed during
an armed conflict. The OTP may, in some cases, need helicopters for
transportation.
F. Annual Meetings of the Staff of the Office of the Prosecutor
132. The Permanent staff and the "reserves" of the Office of the
Prosecutor need to meet annually. The OTP should hold an annual 4-
day conference at the seat of the Tribunal. The purpose of this meeting
would be to update the "reserves" on current legal, procedural, and
practical developments that would affect their work. The meetings
would also cross-fertilize, for the benefit of the OTP, any new skills
and techniques learned by the "reserves" in their regular work. The
meetings would also bring in speakers to lecture on legal, factual, or
political issues likely to arise during the next year ahead. This will al-
low the OTP to consult non-lawyers with regional or local expertise to
benefit from their factual knowledge. Finally, the meetings would
serve to establish and maintain personal relationships among OTP
staff If "reserves" are activated during the year, they can expect that
the work will require close teamwork.
V. THE REGISTRY
133. The Registry handles administrative and judicial support for
the Court and all those aspects of the ICC other than the Office of the
Prosecutor.
134. In concept, the Registry should follow the same principle as
the Office of the Prosecutor: minimize overhead in times of relative in-
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activity, and maximize capability to handle busy caseloads when they
occur. For the Registry, this will be easier than for the Office of the
Prosecutor. Because the Registry of the ICC will not have to support
the initial "ramp-up" of the OTP, the Registry will have sufficient time
to "ramp up" its operations in an orderly way. Thus, the Registry will
not need a "reserve system" to the degree required to make the OTP
effective. The Registry will likely have anywhere from 30 days to a
year to staff itself fully. It will have time to recruit qualified personnel
from the five regions of the world when, and as, they are needed to
staff the operations of the ICC.
A. The Permanent Staff
135. When the ICC is relatively inactive, the functions of the Reg-
istry will be somewhat limited. The permanent staff of the Registry
should include:
Chart 8
The Registry - Permanent Staff
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* The REGISTRAR. As with the ICTY/ICTR, the Registrar would hold
the equivalent rank of a United Nations Assistant Secretary-
General.
- The IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR. This would include a
Deputy Registrar and a Personal Assistant to the Registrar.
- An ARcHmIsT whose job it is to preserve the records of the ICC
and, presumably, the archives of the ICTY and ICTR when they
are no longer active. Preservation of all this material is vital for
the historical record. The Archivist will also be responsible for ar-
ranging exhibitions of ICC (and ICTY and ICTR) archives at muse-
urns and other exhibitions around the world. If an important part
of the ICC's function is to serve as a historical reminder of the im-
portance of international justice, this will be one of the most impor-
tant functions within the ICC.
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- A LIBRARY, staffed by a Head Librarian and 2 assistants. The i-
brary will maintain a collection of international legal materials rel-
evant to the work of the ICC and will serve as a resource for schol-
ars and practitioners around the world. The library will also be
responsible for making ICC (and ICTY and ICTR) materials availa-
ble to government officials, scholars, practitioners, journalists and
the public, worldwide, over the Internet, or by whatever future
means allow the most cost-effective delivery of information
worldwide.
- A CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISOR who will handle construction and
support work in the event the ICC (both the OTP and the Court)
need to establish field offices. This is a skill that, arguably, will not
be needed frequently, and some might argue it is not necessarily to
have someone permanently on staff who can do this. The experi-
ence of the ICTY and, particularly, the ICTR teaches otherwise.
The number of people who can do this kind of job extraordinarily
well is so small that the ICC cannot afford to take the chance that
the right person will available when the ICC's need arises.
" SECURITY GUARDS.
" GENERAL SERVICES.
" CONFERENCE SUPPORT. Even when the ICC has no active cases,
the Registry will need to support the plenary sessions of the judges.
These should be held twice a year. The Registry will also need to
support the Committee of States Parties once a year and to support
any executive council the Committee appoints to meet more
frequently.
B. The Registry During Active Matters
136. During active matters, the Registry will have to expand con-
siderably. The remainder of this subpart will discuss several of the
Sections and Units within the Registry.
Chart 9
The Registry - During Active Matters
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1. Administrative Services Section
137. The Registry will need to maintain separate units to handle
accounting, budgeting and finance, and personnel. The Administrative
Services Section will have to supervise the Electronic Support Services
Unit, the security guards, the Construction Supervision Unit, and the
General Services Unit.
138. Unlike the Registry of the ICTY and ICTR, the Administra-
tive Services Section will serve only the Registry, the Chambers (see
part VI below) and defense counsel (see subpart V B 8 below), not the
Office of the Prosecutor. Thus, its size will be smaller than the Admin-
istrative Services Section of the ad hoc tribunals.
139. Because the ICC will be funded by initial contributions from
States Parties, cash management skills will be important in this sec-
tion. When the ICC is relatively inactive, the budgetary needs of the
ICC should be relatively predictable. During an active matter, how-
ever, considerable expertise will be required to ensure that funds are
available when needed.
2. Electronic Support Services Unit
140. The Electronic Support Services Unit will handle computer
support and system maintenance for the Registry and the Chambers.
It will also be responsible for the audio-visual equipment in the court-
rooms and for technical liaison with the media. It will report to the
head of the Administrative Services Section.
3. Construction Supervision Unit
141. When the workload warrants, the Construction Supervisor
(see previous section) will be assisted by a unit that will be responsible
for establishing courtroom and office facilities for cases being tried in,
or near, where the crimes occurred. The unit would probably include a
contract officer and assistant. Much of the work will be done by
outside contractors acting under the supervision of the unit. The Con-
struction Supervision Unit will report to the head of the Administra-
tive Services Section.
4. Additional security guards and general services personnel
142. During an active matter, the ICC will require additional se-
curity guards and general services personnel. These units will report
to the head of the Administrative Services Section.
5. Press and Information Office
143. During active matters, a Press and Information Office (PIO)
will handle media relations for the Court and the ICC as an institu-
tion. (Press relations for the OTP are handled from within the OTP.)
The PIO will report directly to the Registrar.
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6. Judicial Support Services Section
144. In addition to the Administrative Services Section, the other
principal section of the Registry is Judicial Support Services. It will
handle support for trials. Separate units within this Section will han-
dle court management and support (responsible for court files), court
reporting (supervises court reporters, transcribes testimony, proofs,
and releases transcripts), legal support (provides legal advice to the
Registry), and the library. It also will supervise Court Management
and Support Unit, Language Services Unit and the Detention Unit. It
will report to the Registrar, but must be responsive to the needs of the
judges.
7. The Language Services Unit
145. The Language Services Unit will handle translation and in-
terpretation for the Registry and the Court. (Translation and interpre-
tation for the Prosecution is handled within the Office of the Prosecu-
tor.) The official languages of the ICC will be French and English, but
the unit must also be able to work in whatever language is used by
witnesses and defendants. This unit will report to the head of the Ju-
dicial Support Services Section. This is a change from ICTY practice,
where Language Services is within Administrative Services.
8. The Defense Counsel Liaison Unit
146. The ICC has an obligation to provide defense counsel to de-
fendants who cannot afford qualified counsel. The ICC may also have
to fund the cost of investigators, translators, and other expenses for
some defendants. Having full-time defense counsel paid by the Tribu-
nal (a "public defender's" office) is not likely to be cost-effective. In
many cases tried by the ICC, multiple defendants will require their
own counsel, as a lawyer's best argument is often likely to be that
some other defendant was more culpable than the lawyer's client. Sep-
arate counsel will be required in many cases, even where there are
multiple defendants with similar defenses.
147. Instead of full-time counsel for the defense, defense counsel
should formally be independent of the Registry, even if funded by it.
This creates the need for two types of supervision.
148. First, the Defense Counsel Liaison Unit should be headed by
a second Deputy Registrar. This Deputy Registrar reports directly to
the Registrar. The Deputy Registrar will be expected to speak directly
to the Registrar to ensure that counsel for the defense are provided
with adequate resources. Failure to provide adequate resources to de-
fense counsel in a timely way has been a major problem for both the
ICTY and ICTR.
149. Second, a Defense Counsel Advisory Board, consisting of
prominent outside attorneys from a variety of legal systems around
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the world should advise the Deputy Registrar on a variety of matters
pertaining to defense counsel. The Defense Counsel Advisory Board
should be consulted on such matters as compensation for defense coun-
sel, the amount of assistance required to assist lead counsel in a given
case, and rules regarding the activities of counsel for defendants.
150. Within the Defense Counsel Liaison Unit is a Defense Wit-
ness Support Unit. This unit will handle both witness support and,
where necessary, witness protection for the defense. (Witness support
and protection for the prosecution is handled within the OTP.)
C. The Detention Supervision Unit
151. When the ICC has suspects in custody (and earlier, if the
ICC is given, and accepts, responsibility for prisoners of the ICTY and
ICTR), a Detention Supervision Unit will be responsible for manage-
ment of those in custody.
152. Pre-trial detainees will, to the extent possible, be detained at
the seat of the Trial Chamber, wherever that may be. This is impor-
tant so that defense counsel can consult with their clients in prepara-
tion for trial.
153. Defendants convicted by the Trial Chamber may be kept in
prison at the seat of the Trial Chamber, or, as is more likely, they may
be transferred to the seat of the Appeal Chamber in The Hague. The
ICC will thus want to continue the relationship established between
the ICTY and the Scheveningen Prison just outside The Hague, where
ICTY prisoners are presently held awaiting trial.
154. If the Appeal Chamber upholds conviction, prisoners will be
detained either in a State that will receive them or in a facility man-
aged by the ICC. The idea of a prison exclusively for those convicted
by the ICC sounds unlikely, given the extraordinarily high security
that would be expected at an institution that incarcerates only those
convicted of the world's most heinous crimes. Logic suggests that dis-
persal of those convicted may make more sense.
155. Regardless of where prisoners serve their sentences, the ICC
should have a voice - and probably the controlling voice - in the
terms and conditions of sentence.
VI. CHAMBERS
A. Organization
156. The judicial organ of the ICC is divided into Chambers, or-
ganized as shown in Chart 10. A case is first brought before the In-
dictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber (IPMC). This chamber
confirms indictments and thereafter hears preliminary legal and proce-
dural rulings until the case is ready for trial.
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157. The trial in the first instance is held before a Trial Cham-
ber.23 For present purposes, it is assumed that there will be three regu-
lar Trial Chambers, with the possibility of a separate chamber to hear
treaty crime cases for the reasons discussed above in subpart IIB. For
this reason, the Treaty Crimes Chamber is shown with dotted lines in
Chart 10. It is possible that there may be more than one Treaty Crime
Chamber.
158. Appeals from the decisions of the Trial Chambers are heard
by the Appeal Chamber. The PrepCom has not yet determined whether
judges may publish concurring or dissenting opinions. The Appeal
Chamber's judgments are final.
24
159. Chambers also includes a Bureau to make administrative de-
cisions for the Court. The Bureau is discussed further in subpart VI D,
below.
B. Status and Compensation of Judges
160. The IPMC and the Trial Chambers consist of four judges, one
of whom is an alternate. The Appeal Chamber consists of either five or
23. The precise stage at which a case is passed from the IPMC to the Trial Cham-
ber will have to be addressed in the rules of procedure.
24. The drafters of the ICC Statute may want to make clear that decisions of the
ICC may not be appealed to national or other supranational courts.
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seven judges. Excluding the possibility of one or more Treaty Crimes
Chambers, this means that the Court will consist of a total of 21 or 23
judges.25
161. The only judges who will be on full-time status in The Hague
will be the four judges of the IPMC and the President of the Court.
Unless the workload of the Court is sufficiently great to justify full-
time status for other judges, other judges will be on a part-time status,
paid a nominal amount plus a per diem when on active service.
162. Compensation for judges should be based on the equivalent of
a United Nations Undersecretary-General. This is the compensation
level for judges sitting on the ICTY and ICTR.
163. Some creativity will be required to set a fair compensation for
judges who are not permanently sitting in The Hague. The PrepCom
has considered limiting the nature of outside work that part-time
judges could undertake while not sitting in the ICC. This will effec-
tively limit the pool of candidates for judicial appointments to already-
sitting judges and academics. The pool may be further limited because
only large and relatively prosperous States can easily afford to have a
senior judge on leave for what could be months at a time. Similarly,
only large and relatively prosperous academic institutions could afford
to have one of their finest scholars away from teaching, research, and
administrative responsibilities for an extended period. It is likely that
there will need to be some flexibility in allowing judges to earn outside
income.
164. A further complicating factor is the question of pensions for
ICC judges. In many States, judges are awarded relatively generous
pensions both because of their many years of service in the law, and
also to make it easier for judges of advanced years or infirmity to step
down with honor and dignity, knowing that their decision need not be
affected in any way by personal financial considerations.
165. The issue of pensions for ICTY and ICTR judges has come up
virtually every year before the United Nations' Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). ICTY and ICTR
judges have argued for parity between the ad hoc criminal tribunals,
whose judges serve 4-year terms, and the International Court of Jus-
tice, whose judges serve 12-year terms. Whatever the proper outcome
of that dispute, the argument for pensions for ICC judges is stronger.
25. Concern was expressed at a recent PrepCom session by one State that the
number of judges should be limited for reasons of economy. Seen in perspective, this con-
cern is misplaced. The cost to support a single additional judge, even on a full-time ba-
sis, is less than 2% of the baseline budget of the ICC, which assumes no active matters.
If the ICC has even a single active matter, the cost of an additional full-time judge is
likely to be less than one-tenth of one percent of the annual ICC budget. Economics
should not play a role in determining the proper number of judges in the ICC.
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166. Whatever proposal is adopted for compensation of judges of
the ICC, all those involved - both the judges and the States Parties
- should incorporate into their thinking that the Committee of States
Parties will review judges' compensation after the Court has been in
operation for several years. The importance of the judicial function is
so overwhelmingly important that the Committee may well decide, af-
ter a few years, to pay all judges on a full-time basis, notwithstanding
the additional cost this would involve. It will probably take several
years of experience with a part-time basis for compensation to con-
vince a skeptical international community that this additional cost is
justified by the need to have the most qualified candidates willing and
able to serve on the Court.
C. Plenary Meetings
167. All the judges of the Court should meet together once a year
in a plenary session. If the Court is busy, plenary meetings may need
to be held twice a year, as is the case with the judges of the ICTY and
ICTR.
168. At plenary sessions, the judges would adopt and amend rules
of procedure, rules regarding detention, rules governing defense coun-
sel and other matters. Some of these decisions will need to be ap-
proved by the Committee of States Parties (see Part VII below), but
the Committee will benefit from the considered thinking of the judges
on these issues.
D. The President and the Bureau
169. The judges of the ICC should annually elect a President from
among the judges of the Appeal Chamber. Each of the other chambers
would also elect a presiding judge for that chamber. The presiding
judge of the IPMC would serve ex officio as the First Vice President of
the Court. A Second Vice President would be elected by the judges of
the Trial Chamber.
170. The President of the Court and the presiding judge of the
IPMC would together serve as the Bureau of the ICC. Both the Presi-
dent and the presiding judge of the IPMC are full-time residents at
the seat of the Tribunal. The Second Vice President, who would not be
a full-time resident at the seat of the Tribunal, would serve on the Bu-
reau only in the event of the death or disability of the President or the
First Vice President.
171. The Bureau's functions are:
- To issue formal orders activating the Trial Chambers or the Ap-
peal Chamber, as needed.
- To make the initial decision where the Trial Chamber should
hear cases. (The Trial Chamber may review this decision.)




- To decide issues involving recusal or disqualification of judges,
and the assignment of judges to chambers.
- To propose amendments to the rules of procedure and other rules
(though other judges may also make such proposals).
* To make other decisions relating to the functioning of the judicial
organ of the Tribunal.
172. On some issues, such as when considering changes in the
rules of procedure, the Bureau should consult with the Prosecutor or
the Registrar.
173. Because the Bureau consists of two judges, it should act by
consensus whenever possible, but in the event of a difference of opin-
ion, the decision of the President should prevail.
174. Administrative support for the Bureau should include one le-
gal assistant, one administrative assistant, and one secretary.
E. The Indictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber
1. Composition and Purpose
175. The Indictment and Preliminary Matters Chamber (IPMC)
consists of four judges who are full-time residents at the seat of the
Tribunal. Three judges are regular members of the IPMC and one
judge serves as an alternate in case one of the three regular judges is
unable to participate for any reason.
176. The IPMC serves the following purposes:
* The IPMC issues rulings prior to the confirmation of
indictments.
* The IPMC confirms indictments sought by the Prosecutor.
* The IPMC issues rulings subsequent to indictments if Trial
Chamber has not yet been convened.
* The IPMC may appoint one of its members to serve as a super-
vising judge to protect the rights of as-yet unidentified defend-
ants in cases where this is required.
177. In addition to the four judges, the IPMC will be supported by
one legal assistant, one administrative assistant, and one secretary.
During active matters, the IPMC should have an usher to assist with
court sessions.
2. Role of the Alternate Judge in the IPMC and Trial Chambers
178. There are many issues regarding the role of the alternate
judge for the drafters of the ICC Statute to consider.
179. The first and most fundamental question is whether to allow
for alternate judges at all. This paper strongly endorses the use of al-
ternate judges in the IPMC and the Trial Chambers. When a matter
has come before the IPMC or a Trial Chamber, the judges will become
familiar with a body of factual issues that gave rise to that matter.
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Continuity is important. It would be disruptive - not to mention a
poor use of limited judicial, prosecutorial, and defense resources - if
the judges' familiarity with those issues were to be lost if a chamber
had to re-start completely when a judge could no longer continue with
a case.
180. In particular cases, especially those before the Trial Cham-
bers, trials may be lengthy affairs. Any number of reasons might cause
a judge not to be able to participate completely through a lengthy
trial. Losing a sitting judge during an ICC trial could be particularly
costly and disruptive. For example, if a judge has to be replaced and
witnesses have to be re-heard, it would be expensive to bring back wit-
nesses who have already testified. Some witnesses might not want to
come back. What happens then? One possibility is that the judges who
heard the witness the first time would consider that witness's testi-
mony, while the new judge would be able to consider only a written or
video transcript, without regard to the judge's personal observations of
the witness's credibility and demeanor. The more likely outcome is that
the witness's testimony could not be considered by any of the judges.
This creates potential for serious mischief, as there could be significant
tactical advantages to the prosecution or the defense to force out one
judge and thereby lose the testimony of a damaging witness. The alter-
native - going forward after replacing a judge with another judge who
has not heard the evidence and been able to form a first-hand opinion
about the credibility of the witness - creates grave problems of per-
ceived injustice to one or both sides in the trial.
181. For these reasons, it is vitally important that the IPMC and
Trial Chambers have an alternate judge. This is not so necessary on
the Appeal Chamber, where all submissions except oral argument
would be in writing. Also, the loss of a judge from a five-member or
seven-member chamber would be relatively less severe than the loss of
one-third of a three-judge Trial Chamber.
182. Assuming that there is an alternate judge in the IPMC and
Trial Chamber, what is the role of the alternate in proceedings? This
paper submits that the alternate judge should participate as fully in
the trial as any other judge. However, only the three regular judges
should participate in deliberations. If one of the regular judges fell se-
riously ill during deliberations, it would not be so much of a burden to
repeat deliberations with the alternate judge present.
183. Another option is to have the alternate judge participate in
deliberations but not to vote. This gives the alternate judge more
power than simply that of a "back-up" to the regular judges.
184. One possibility independent of the two options just discussed
is to choose the alternate judge by lot at the start of deliberations.
This makes all judges equal during trial (except for the role of the pre-
siding judge at trial), and prevents any judge from being seen to have
"second-class" status by virtue of being the alternate judge. On the
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other hand, the Committee of States Parties may prefer to choose
which judges sit as regular members and which judge serves as the al-
ternate judge.
F. Trial Chambers
185. The Trial Chambers do not permanently sit at the seat of the
Tribunal. Instead, they are activated by order of the Bureau when
they are to consider active cases. Normally, a Trial Chamber should
expect 30 days' notice before being required to hear a case. This should
give the judges time to arrange their affairs and take up residence at
the seat of the Tribunal. It will also allow time to determine where the
Trial Chamber should hear cases. The initial choice of location should
be made by the Bureau, but the Trial Chamber should have the power
to decide where to hear cases if it is persuaded that one or another lo-
cation would best serve the interests of justice.
186. Initially, there should be three Trial Chambers. This number
may need to be increased by the Committee of States Parties if the
caseload warrants it.
187. Each Trial Chamber includes three regular judges and one al-
ternate judge. (For a discussion of alternate judges, see section VI E 2,
180, above.)
188. Administratively, when a Trial Chamber is active, it should
have a support staff of one legal assistant, four law clerks, one admin-
istrative assistant, one secretary, and one usher.
189. Depending on the nature of the matter, an active Trial
Chamber may also require its own computer specialist and its own
document management specialist. Under ordinary cases, the Trial
Chamber can rely on the Registry for this support. However, if the
Trial Chamber is located away from the seat of the Tribunal, or if the
matters before the Trial Chamber are especially sensitive, the com-
puter and the document management specialists should be under the
administrative control of the Chamber.
G. The Appeal Chamber
190. The Appeal Chamber does not sit permanently at the seat of
the Tribunal. Instead, it would be activated by the Bureau on 90 days'
notice when a matter is brought to the Appeal Chamber. In many
cases, the rules should provide sufficient guidance for an appeal to be
lodged formally with the Appeal Chamber even though most of its
judges have not yet gathered together.
191. The Appeal Chamber consists of five or seven judges. The
President of the Court presides over the Appeal Chamber. There are
no alternates.
192. The administrative staff of the Appeal Chamber, when active,
would include one legal assistant, five or seven law clerks (one for
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each judge), one administrative assistant, two secretaries, and one
usher.
VII. COMMITTEE OF STATES PARTIES
A. Management Oversight of the ICC
193. Overall responsibility for management oversight of the ICC is
in the hands of the Committee of States Parties. The Committee in-
cludes all States that are a party to the treaty establishing the ICC.
The Committee should meet at least annually, though it must be pos-
sible to hold emergency meetings of the full Committee if needed. Each
State has one vote in the Committee. An Executive Council, discussed
below, must be available to meet more frequently.
194. The purposes of the Committee are:
- To be responsible for management oversight. The Committee
must avoid getting involved in specific cases.
- To elect Judges, the Prosecutor, and the Registrar. If a vacancy
occurs between sessions, the Executive Committee may fill the va-
cancy until the next meeting of the Committee.
" To add Trial Chambers, if needed.
" To approve rules of procedure, rules on detention, rules relating
to defense counsel, and so on.
- To approve budgets and to apportion costs. Budgeting should be
on a two to three years-ahead basis.
" To direct the audit of accounts.
" To appoint an Investigator General who could, if the need should
ever arise, look into causes of misconduct by Tribunal officials.
- To establish, if the need is sufficient, an administrative tribunal
for ICC personnel.
- To make the final decision on charges of misconduct against se-
nior Tribunal officials.
195. To ensure that States meet their financial obligations to sup-
port the ICC, States that are not current on their financial obligations
may participate in the Committee but have their vote suspended.
B. The Executive Council
196. The Executive Council is an organ of the Committee of States
Parties and provides a means for more frequent management meetings
to assist the work of the ICC. Its purposes are:
- To review possible candidates for judges, the Prosecutor and the
Registrar, and to make nominations to the Committee.
- In the event of a vacancy in the Prosecutor or Registrar, the
normal scenario would be for the principal Deputy Prosecutor or the
Deputy Registrar to assume the formal responsibilities of Prosecutor or
Registrar. However, in some cases, it may be necessary for the Execu-
tive Council to make interim appointments for someone to serve as
acting Prosecutor or Registrar.
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* To work with the Prosecutor, the Registrar and the Bureau to
develop budgets for presentation to the Committee of States Parties.
197. The Executive Council acts by majority vote. There should be
no vetoes. It should meet at least quarterly, with urgent consultations
made on an as-needed basis. Each State on the Executive Council
must have a designated representative at the seat of the Tribunal or
within a few hours' train ride. For example, if the seat of the Tribunal
is The Hague, a designated representative could be permanently based
in Brussels and still be able to participate in urgent meetings of the
Executive Council.
198. The size and manner of election of the Executive Council is
beyond the scope of this paper. Major contributors are likely to insist
on seats. However, any State that is not current on its financial obliga-
tions may participate in the Executive Council, but should have its
vote suspended.
VIII. COST ESTIMATES
199. This Part will present cost estimates for the ICC under a va-
riety of operating assumptions. Many of those assumptions have been
set out in Parts III-VII of this paper. In addition, however, there are
some philosophical assumptions that affect resource demands. These
assumptions should be addressed explicitly.
A. Some Philosophical Assumptions That Affect the Budget
1. The ICC prosecutes "Big Fish"
200. Limited resources, both economic and judicial, mean that the
ICC should focus its attention on the most serious of crimes and the
most culpable of defendants - the so-called "big fish." Thus, the num-
ber of defendants per matter will be on the order of 1-100, but not in
the thousands or tens of thousands, even where (as in Rwanda) the
number of culpable persons is very large.
201. The experience of the ICTY and ICTR suggests that it may be
easier to prosecute cases against high-level perpetrators rather than
against lower-level trigger-pullers. The doctrine of command responsi-
bility helps produce this result. In a case involving, for example, a
camp guard, the prosecution must tie the defendant to a specific crime
more than just an ordinary murder, rape, or beating. Given the uncer-
tainty of human memory under the most stressful of situations, such
cases are a challenge to present. In contrast, there is usually less un-
certainty over who is the commander of a military unit or installation,
or who holds high public office.
2. Complementarity will encourage more national prosecutions.
202. The existence of an ICC, along with the principle of comple-
mentarity, will encourage more national prosecutions of mid-level and
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low-level perpetrators. The assumption is that States will want to
prosecute their own where politically feasible. In many cases, both ex-
ternal and internal political pressures may call for the prosecution of
top-level perpetrators by an international tribunal, namely the ICC.
This will relieve the ICC of the need to focus investigative and
prosecutorial resources on relatively lower-level participants.
3. Prompt investigations reduce costs - as well as increase
deterrence
203. The delays in startup of the ICTY and ICTR have driven
home the fact that prompt investigations can reduce costs. Prompt mo-
bilization of ICC OTP Case Units will enable witness interviews to be
undertaken before witnesses are dispersed. Evidence can be gathered
quickly before it is lost.
Chart 11
Conceptual Illustration of How Time Affects
the Cost of Gathering Information
Cost to know what's going
on in the world this minute:
$ tens of millions
(intelligence services)
Cost to investigate a case that
happened several years ago:
$ millions (ICTY/ICTR)
Cost to know what's going on
in the world a few hours ago: Cost to investigate a case that
$30 month (CNN) happened last week:
$ thousands (local police)
Cost to know what went on
in the world yesterday: $0.60
(newspaper) Time
204. In general, the cost of gathering information increases when
investigation is delayed. Chart 11 is a conceptual illustration of this
principle. If a State wishes to know what is happening elsewhere in
the world on a real-time basis, the State must employ intelligence
agencies or national technical means, at a cost in the tens of millions
of dollars. To find out what is happening on a few select stories within
the past several hours, the cost drops to the subscription fee for CNN
or other television news sources. To find out what happened within the
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last 24-48 hours, the cost is reduced further to the price of a good
newspaper, a fraction of a dollar a day.
205. Over time, however, the cost to reconstruct information in-
creases. To investigate a major crime that occurred last week, a local
police force may spend thousands of dollars to have half a dozen police
investigators interview witnesses from the crime scene. Within a week
of the crime, the witnesses have not had a chance to disperse, and
their memories are relatively fresh. It may be necessary to interview
only 4 or 5 witnesses to find out what, a year later, would require in-
terviews of 15 or 20 witnesses.
206. The problem faced by the ICTY (and, to a lesser extent, the
ICTR) was that, years after the crimes occurred, witnesses were widely
dispersed. For example, survivors of crimes in Bosnia had been relo-
cated throughout Europe, Asia, and North America. In addition, many
witnesses had not moved far in distance but had moved to places
whose authorities would not make them available to ICTY
investigators.
207. A final point about the importance of a rapid response is that
knowledge that the Prosecutor is moving quickly may help deter some
crimes from occurring. In a number of instances - Rwanda being but
one example - perpetrators of massive crimes have counted on little
or no international media attention to give them time to commit their
crimes. A Prosecutor with a rapid-response capability can help to mo-
bilize international attention. International media attention may dis-
courage crimes from being committed in the first place.
208. The key to rapid response is a staff of people with the cash
resources to secure necessary transportation and other specialized in-
vestigative resources for the case at hand. Money but no staff would
require the Prosecutor to take the time to recruit staff before going out
into the field. Correspondingly, investigators without travel money are
just as unable to get out into the field. Sometimes the investigators
will need cash to hire extra security; other times, they may need their
cash for forensic equipment. It is impossible to predict with absolute
certainty what will be the most urgent need when a matter arises, but
both ready staff and ready cash must be available at once.
B. A Baseline Budget
209. As discussed above in section IV A 1, 81, the baseline
budget of the ICC - those resources that will be required when there
are no active matters - should as small as possible, consistent with
the need to be able to respond quickly when a matter arises.
1. Staffing
210. Appendix A is an outline of a staffing table for the Office of
the Prosecutor, the Registry and Chambers. It shows, at the top, sala-
ries for grades that approximate those of the United Nations system,
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ranging from the top - Undersecretary-General, for the judges and
the Prosecutor - down through P-2, general service level, and secur-
ity. The personnel figures shown reflect the baseline or core staff de-
scribed above in sections IV B 1, 90, and V A 1, 135. Other units
that would become activated at a later time are also shown.
211. Table 3 summarizes the staffing required for the baseline
budget of the Tribunal:
Table 3
Summary of Staffing Table - Baseline Budget
Professionals Support Staff Total
Office of the Prosecutor 15 8 23
Registry 7 23 30
Chambers 7 5 12
Total 29 36 65
2. Annual baseline budget
212. Appendix B shows a detailed baseline budget for the ICC. As-
suming there are no active matters, the budget is estimated at $12.4
million a year. Table 4 summarizes the figures shown in Appendix B.
3. Startup expenses.
213. Appendix C shows a detailed budget for the startup expenses
of the ICC. Startup expenses are estimated at $13.8 million. Table 5
summarizes the figures shown in Appendix B.
4. Additional security at the Aegon building vs. the cost of a new
building for the ICC
214. This does not include the cost to upgrade security at the
Aegon building as discussed above in subpart III D, 71, or, in the al-
ternative, to build a new facility to house the Tribunal. Appendix C
also presents an estimate of these costs, which total $11.75 million,
though some of the costs are in the alternative. In particular, if the
courtrooms are relocated to the interior of the Aegon building, at an
estimated cost of $3,000,000, then the need to increase security at the
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215. To the $11.75 million cost to upgrade security must be added the
rental that the ICC would pay for the Aegon building. By the time of
possible occupancy of the Aegon building by an ICC, the United Na-
tions will be paying $2,954,500 for rent, cleaning and building mainte-
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26. Given that the building rental by 1999 would be approximately $2.45 million,
this would imply a purchase price of between $20.4 million and $40.8 million, depending
on the implied discount rate (these estimates assume a discount rate of between 6% and
12%). This estimate excludes any applicable taxes. To determine a fair purchase price for
the Aegon building would require a formal appraisal. If the ICC is going to stay in the











216. Thus, the total cost for the Aegon building with enhanced se-
curity could be $26.5 million over a five-year period, with additional
rental and other expenses beyond year five in addition to this. In con-
trast, if the Government of The Netherlands will donate a suitable site
in The Hague, a new building could probably be constructed for $15
million to $25 million that would be more secure and better suited for
the needs of the Tribunal. A new building may be more cost-effective
in the long run.
C. One to Two Active Matters
217. The cost to investigate and prosecute an active matter from
start to finish is so dependent on the specific facts of the matter that
any estimate is little more than an order-of-magnitude approximation.
Indeed, the experience of the ICTY and the ICTR provides little worth-
while guidance.
218. The first budget for the ICTY was a four-line-item budget of
$31.2 million on the last page of the Secretary-General's report that
formed the basis of the ICTY's Statute, adopted in May 1993.27 This
became the basis for a budget of $33.2 million in December of 1993,
28
later revised to $32.6 million in March of 1994.29 This budget was for
what, at the time, were the remaining seven quarters in the biennium
1994-95. This was increased slightly, so that the ICTY's expenditures
for 1994-95 were approximately $35.8 million (net).30 The ACABQ ap-
proved a one-year budget for the ICTY for 1996 that was approxi-
mately $40.8 million (gross),31 and for the ICTR, $38.8 million (gross).
32
There are indications in the budget made public by the Secretary-
General that both Tribunals are expected to seek substantial increases
for 1997. 33 In the meantime, the Secretary-General has sought what
27. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, Addendum, Annex at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add.1
(1993).
28. Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for the Serious lolations of International Humanitaarian Law Committed in the Ter.
ritory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, UN. GAOR, 5th Comm., 48th Sess., 1 56,
U.N. Doc. A/C.5/48/44 (1993).
29. Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 5th Comm., Addendum, 48th Sess.,
9 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/48/44 (1994).
30. Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Respondible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991: Report of the Secretary General, U.N.
GAOR, 5th Comm., 51st Sess., Table 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/51/30 (1996).
31. Id.
32. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,
supra note 5, at Table 1.
33. Id. at 1, for the ICTR; for the ICTY, see Financing of the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Human-
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amounts to a zero-growth budget, in terms of staff, in the provisional
dollar amounts for 1997 of $53.5 million (gross) for the ICTY and
$46.7 million (gross) for the ICTR.
219. Even with these budgets, there are substantial unmet needs
that both the ICTY and ICTR have. These include:
- WITNESS PROTECTION, SECURITY, OR RELOCATION. At present, a small
staff in each Tribunal tries to arrange witness relocation. As a
practical matter, this can be done only in high-profile cases. Many
witnesses who deserve special protection, security, or relocation
simply cannot get it.
- TRANSPORTATION. Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR have adequate
transportation for investigators.
- MASS GRAVE EXHUMATION. So far, both ad hoc tribunals have been
able to rely on voluntary contributions to undertake mass grave ex-
humations. This is not sustainable. It would be imprudent to as-
sume that voluntary contributions will always be available to pay
for these essential investigative needs.
220. Clearly, the budgets for the ICTY and the ICTR are not yet
at equilibrium between the needs of those matters and the resources
available to bring those matters to a successful conclusion.
221. Based on experience thus far, and given the range of matters
that an ICC would have to investigate, it seems reasonable to plan on
a cost for an active matter between a minimum of $10 million and a
maximum of $150 million a year, with the most likely scenario being
between $30 million and $60 million a year. These assumptions in-
clude an allowance of $10 million per matter to establish field offices
and courtroom facilities away from the seat of the Tribunal.
222. It should be recognized that these budget figures are in addi-
tion to the baseline budget, but they also imply a significantly stronger
investigative and prosecutorial effort than either the ICTY or the
ICTR has been able to mount to date. For example, about $10 million
of the baseline budget of the ICC is included in the ICTY's $30 mil-
lion-$40 million budget. This includes rental on the Aegon building,
salaries for some Tribunal personnel, equipment, and the like.
D. Three or More Active Matters
223. If the work of the ICC involves several ongoing matters at
once, the cost of each additional matter would probably not be as great
as the first one or two active matters then underway. Standard princi-
ples of economics suggest that the marginal cost of each additional in-
vestigation ought to be less. Table 6 below illustrates this principle.
itarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Report of




224. Initial discussion has already taken place on how the ICC
should be financed.34
1. Assume financing from States Parties by class
225. This paper recommends that the ICC be financed by the
States Parties, by class. In this way, one State is not responsible for
the dominant share of the ICC's expenses. (Nor could one State claim
a dominant voice in the management of the ICC.) The wealthiest
States Parties should all pay the same share. Second-tier States Par-
ties would pay a lesser amount, and so on. The number of classes is
somewhat arbitrary; but five seems a reasonable number.
Table 6
Cost of Many Active Matters at Once
Annual Cost per Annual Cost per
Matter for One or Matter for Three or
Two Matters More Matters
Minimum Cost $10 million $5 million
Maximum Cost $150 million $100 million
Range of Most $30-$60 million $20-$50 million
Likely Matters
2. States that bring complaints should not ordinarily be expected
to contribute to the cost of that case
226. While some have suggested that States that bring complaints
should pay for the costs of investigation and prosecution of those com-
plaints, this paper takes the view that this should not be required. Re-
quiring contributions in every case creates the appearance of a conflict
of interest between those paying the bills and those who must, impar-
tially, conduct the investigation. Instead, the cost of the case should be
apportioned among the States Parties by class as part of the cost of in-
ternational justice.
34. See, e.g., Committee Is Told Proposed International Criminal Court Should Be
Complementary to National Jurisdictions, U.N. press release, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2876,
(1995); Preparatory Committee for International Criminal Court Continues Discussing
Creation of Court by Treaty, U.N. press release, U.N. Doc. GA/112808, (1996); Preparatory
Committee for International Criminal Court Concludes Second Session, U.N. press re-
lease, UN. Doc. GA/L'2813, 30 August 1996. See also Institute for Global Policy, Pros-
pects for the Financing of an International Criminal Court, 1996.
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227. Voluntary contributions should not be refused. They should
be accepted at the discretion of the Prosecutor or the Registry, as the
case may be.
3. States Parties that bring Treaty Crime complaints may con-
tribute to cost of that case
228. In treaty crime cases, funding by the States bringing the case
to the ICC may be appropriate. Presumably, all involved States would
agree on a percentage share of costs to be paid by each of them.
Wealthier States may want to contribute to a voluntary fund so that
smaller States Parties are not prevented from bringing treaty crime
cases.
4. Sixty States Parties should be able to give the Tribunal ade-
quate funding that its successful startup is assured
229. If each of 60 States Parties sign the treaty setting up the
ICC, and each State pays $1 million upon signing the treaty, this
would give the Tribunal a startup fund of $60 million. This sum
should be adequate to finance startup costs and one large or two small
active matters during the first year or two of operations. The Commit-
tee of the States Parties will then have a year to review a budget for
subsequent years.
5. The ICC should budget three years ahead
230. The ICC should adopt the practice of preparing budgets three
years ahead, so that the States Parties can plan how to fulfill their fi-
nancial obligations to the Tribunal. Presumably, in any given budget
year, the budget for the next year should be highly specific, the budget
for two years out will be general, and the budget for three years ahead
would be contingent. Requiring advance planning will be an important
exercise to ensure that ICC staff and the States Parties have ade-
quately planned for the Tribunal's future needs.
IX CONCLUSION
231. With only a limited amount of PrepCom time available, now
is the time for those involved in drafting the ICC Statute to consider
administrative and financial issues affecting the future of the ICC:
- EASIER TO Do Now THAN LATER. Small changes can be made now
to the ICC Statute to improve administrative efficiency. Those
changes, at the present time, are likely to be non-controversial.
Changing the Statute at a later date may be difficult.
- A SUCCESSFUL START FOR THE ICC Is VITAL. If the ICC is seen
from the outset as doing justice, its authority and legitimacy will
be strengthened. This strength will not only increase cooperation
with the ICC, it should also help deter violations of international
humanitarian law from being committed. Administrative and finan-
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cial issues must not be allowed to cause the ICC to stumble. A first
success will create the momentum for further successes.
- MANY LESSONS ARE AVAILABLE FROM EXPERIENCE OF ICTY AND
ICTR. The experiences of the ICTY and the ICTR have taught the
international community much about what an international crimi-
nal tribunal needs to succeed. That experience should be applied in
the drafting of the ICC Statute.
• PROPER HANDLING OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCILL ISSUES ARE
ESSENTIAL FOR THE ICC'S SUCCESS. For the ICC to succeed, consider-
able efforts and talents from States Parties and from the best ju-
rists, prosecutors, investigators and administrators will be essen-
tial. The Statute of the International Criminal Court must provide
a sound administrative and financial foundation to ensure that the
ICC becomes an effective instrument of international justice.
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Administrative and Financial Issues of the
International Criminal Court - Appendices
Appendix A - Staffing
($ Thousands) USG ASG D-2 D-I P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2 GS-PL GS-OL SS
Base Salary 145 125 115 105 95 85 75 50 40 30 30
Full-Cost 181 156 144 131 119 106 94 63 50 38 38
(+25%)
(Figures shown are rounded to nearest thousand; unrounded figures used in
calculations)
Staffing Table





Ch. Admin. 1 I
Budget Officer 1
Personnel Officer 1 I
Travel Officer I I
Legal Services Unit
Counsel 3 1 1
Research Unit
Director 1
Staff 1 2 1 1
Column Totals 1 0 0 3 4 3 3 1 3 5 0
Total Professionals 15 Support Staff 8
Startup Unit
Staff 1 2 2 2 2 4
Deployment Unit
Staff 1 1 3 4
First Case Unit
Lawyers 1 1 2 1 2 2
Investigators 1 2 1 1
Translators 1 2 3
Liaison Officer I
Victim & Witness Unit
Staff I 3-10 1-8 3-5
Litigation Support Unit
Staff 1 2-5 2-5 20-40
Computer Services Unit
Staff 1 0-1 0-1 2-8
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Video Preservation and Analysis Unit
Staff





















Column Totals 0 1
Total Professionals
1 0 2 2
Support Staff 23






















USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2 GS-PL GS-OL SS
Defense Counsel Liaison Unit
Defense Counsel Liaison Unit 1 2 2
Defense Witness Support Unit 1 I














Staff I I I
Column Totals 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 3 0
Total Professionals 7 Support Staff 5
Appeal Chamber - When Active
Judges 6
Secretaries 1 2
Legal Assistants/Clerks 1 7
Usher I
Active Trial Chambers (1st active chamber)
Judges 4
Secretaries 1
Legal Assistants/Clerks 1 4
Usher 1
Active Trial Chambers (2d active chamber)
Judges 4
Secretaries 1
Legal Assistants/Clerks 1 4
Usher I
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y390 VOL. 25:2
1997 ORGANIZATION 391
USG ASG D-2 D-l P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2 GS-PL GS-OL SS
Active Trial Chambers (3d active chamber)
Judges 4
Secretaries
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Appendix B - Baseline Budget
(Assuming no active matters)
All figures in US$
Office of the Prosecutor
Salaries
Salaries at Full Cost 2,050,000 See staffing table.
/ USG, OASG, OD-2, 3 D-I. 4 P-5, 3 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 P-2/1, 3 GS-PI, 5 GS-OL, 0 Security






















40,000 Assumes no matters become active.
Subtotal: $40,000
30,750 1.5% of salaries, based on ICTY 1996 (ICTY 1995
was 0.5%)
5,000 Assumption. Acquisition of furniture is covered
under Startup Expenses.
80,000 Hardware and software maintenance, subscriptions
to electronic services
Subtotal: $115,750
157,500 Assume 50 people travel at an average cost per
person of $1500 airfare, $350/day hotel+meals for 4
days, and $250 for taxis and incidentals
20,000 Contract translation for four days.




Salaries at Full Cost 1,625,000
0 USG, I ASG, 0 D-2, I D-1, 0 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, I P-2/I, 1 GS-PL, 10 GS-OL, 12 Security
Temporary Assistance 173,875 10.7% of salaries, based on ICTY 1996 experience.
and Overtime
Consultants and Experts 10,000 Assumption.
Subtotal: $1,808,875
Travel





30,000 Assumes no matters become active.
Subtotal: $30,000
2,000,000 ICTY 1995-97 have budgeted $4 million-$5 million
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Furniture Maintenance 5,000 Assumption. Acquisition of furniture is covered
and Replacement under Startup Expenses.
Computer Database 20,000 Hardware and software maintenance, subscriptions
Maintenance and Expenses to electronic services.
Hospitality 2,900 ICTY 1997.
Expenses of Conference 200,000 Estimated cost of translators, setup, rental of




Rent 2,766,700 Based on rental of all of Aegon building. Another
approach would be to have a small office for core
staff and to acquire additional office space only when
necessary.
Detention Facilities 50,000 An "option" on jail cells at Scheveningen prison.
Cleaning Service 212,700 ICTY 1997. Assumes all of Aegon or equivalent
space.




Salaries at Full Cost 1,331,250
5 USG, 0 ASG, 0 D-2, 0 D-i, 0 P-5, 2 P-4, 0 P-3, 0 P-2/1, 2 GS-PL, 3 GS-OL, 0 Security
Common Costs of Judges 133,125 10% of salaries.
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Appendix C - Startup Expenses
(During the first 18 months)
Office of the Prosecutor
Salaries





for 40% of Startup Unit
Consultants and Experts
Travel








Equipment - 2 satellite














1,584,375 For 1.5 years. See staffing table.
460,000 Assume average of $20,000 per person.





23,766 Same 1.5% of salaries as Baseline Budget.
460,000 Based on ICTY 1995+1996; much ICTY 1994
furniture was donated by Aegon.
545,000 Based on ICTY 1997 cost of satellite earth stations
($555,000 for 3 earth stations) plus 8 secure
telephones and 8 secure fax machines (ICTY
budgeted $25,000 for 2 secure telephones and 2
secure faxes) plus $75,000 for other equipment.




2,000,000 Based on $3.4 million for ICTY in 1994-95, $1.3
million in 1996 and 2.8 million in 1997. This assumes
some furniture will need to be bought for temporary
quarters, but that eventually the Aegon building (or at
least its furniture) will be available.
4,500,000 Will probably have to upgrade computers used by
ICTY.
250,000 Will eventually use ICTY equipment, but will need
some for evidence preservation purposes in the
meantime.
400,000 Secure telephones, radiotelephones and computers.











1,251,114 10% for contingencies
13,762,255
Improving Aegon Building Security
Congresgebouw
Metal Detectors
15 Security Guards for
5 Years, Plus Supervisor
Courtroom Remodeling
Barriers to Garage
Close Johann de Wittlaan
Eisenhowerlaan near Aegon
250,000
2,000,000 Assume guard + equipment is $25,000/year
3,000,000 May not be feasible given building interior.
150,000
350,000 Does not value the effect of a major disruption to
traffic in The Hague.
Buy Adjacent Residential 6,000,000 Does not value benefit to ICC of having non-secure
Office Buildings on Northwest office space or residences for Tribunal staff.
Side of Eisenhowerlaan
Total for Additional Aegon 11,750,000
Security
Figure above does not include rent on the Aegon building
Rent Through 2007 2,450,800 ICTY 1997 excl. courtroom renovation
Cleaning Cost (annual) 212,700 Based on ICTY 1997 use of space




Total Cost to Secure
Aegon





Alternative: Constructing a New Building for Tribunal
Likely Minimum
Likely Maximum
15,000,000
25,000,000

